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/. Introduction 
Many in the West seem to regard the collapse of the so-called 
communist regimes in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as proof 
that capitalism is the only viable economic system. These writers often 
consider it one of capitalism's strengths that it is "value neutral" or "non-
ideological." They see economics as a purely logistic science that deals 
with finding the most efficient way to reach given ends.1 On this view, 
capitalism succeeds where communism fails because it builds on 
objective facts and works with human beings as they are, rather than 
hobbling itself with ethical constraints and trying to work with human 
beings as they ought to be. 
Accepting this "engineering" approach to economics only apparently 
makes questions about the good life disappear. In order to justify any 
political or economic theory, one must show that it meets essential human 
needs and otherwise promotes the good life for those who employ it.2 This, 
in turn, requires that one decide what human beings are, what motivates 
them, and what is valuable in a human life. I call this set of claims about 
human nature a thinker's "philosophical anthropology." Although "value 
neutral" economics seem at first glance to allow each individual to make 
up his or her own mind about how to live and simply explains the best way 
to employ resources reach those goals, in fact such economic theories 
merely leave their ethical foundations unstated. 
1 Amartya Sen calls this the "engineering" approach to economics in 
"Economic Behavior and Moral Sentiments," in On Ethics and Economics, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). (Hereafter referred to as Sen). I am grateful to 
Ann Cudd for her help and comments on this project. 
2 I am here implicitly relying upon the idea that no political or economic 
theory can entirely ignore normative questions and be purely descriptive. 
Although I agree that giving an accurate description of economic activity is 
the primary goal of any economic theory, we would have no compelling 
reasons to accept policy recommendations based on such a theory unless 
it could provide convincing arguments that we would be better off if we 
follow its recommendations rather than pursue some alternative course of 
action. In order to justify claims that one outcome is better than another, a 
theory must rely on at least some minimal normative standards. 
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In this paper, I will examine the works of Adam Smith, one of the most 
influential exponents of modern capitalist economic theory.3 I will argue 
that his theory does rest and must rest on a number of claims that have 
far-reaching ethical and political implications. Some of the most 
interesting and important of these concern the role of the poor in a 
capitalist economy. As Smith says, "no society can surely be flourishing 
and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and 
miserable."4 By examining Smith's discussion of the poor, I hope to reveal 
both the philosophical anthropology implicit in capitalist theory and its use 
in the theory's ethical justification. 
//. Smith's Philosophical Anthropology 
Smith does not spend much time in the Wealth of Nations 
articulating his philosophical anthropology, so I will rely primarily on his 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments for my exposition of it. Since Smith 
published a sixth edition of this work shortly before his death in 1790, it 
seems safe to assume that he did not see a conflict between his moral 
theory and the economic theory that he presents in the Wealth of 
Nations.5 Those wanting to take an Althusserian approach and focus 
exclusively on Smith's economics would have to explain why Smith 
continued to update and develop his moral theory until the end of his life. 
For Smith, human beings have a strong instinct for survival.6 This 
instinct, coupled with our "propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for another"7 causes us to form societies in order to produce the 
goods we need to survive. Society is held together by, and economic 
activity is driven by, the principles of sympathy (or fellow-feeling) and self-
love, and the secondary principles that are derived from them. 
Sympathy is "our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever."8 Through 
sympathy, we imagine ourselves in the place of others and experience 
their feelings. Sympathy is a pleasurable sensation that draws human 
3 Smith himself was well aware of the relationship between economics and 
ethics, but many of his modern followers seem to have lost sight of this 
fact. See Sen, pg. 2. 
4 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd eds., (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Classics, 81), I.viii.36 (pg. 96). (Hereafter referred to as WN). 
5 Adam Smith, The Theory of the Moral Sentiments, D.D. Raphael and A. 
L. Macfie eds., (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1982), pg. 20. (Hereafter 
referred to as TMS. All quotations are from the sixth edition of 1790). 
6 See TMS VII.iU.34 (pg. 287). "Nature, in her sound and healthful state, 
seems never to prompt us to suicide." 
7WNI.ii.l-2(pp.25-26). 
8TMSI.i.I.4(pg.lO). 
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9 Although sympathizing with someone who is unhappy causes us to share 
in his or her unhappiness, the act of sympathizing itself is still pleasant. 
10TMSI.iii.2(pg.62).' 
11TMSl.iii.33(pg.62). 
1 2 TMS l.iii.2.1(pp 50-51). 
1 3 WN l.xi.c.31 (pg. 190). 
1 4 TMS Uii.3.1 (pg.61). 
15TMSlLii.2.1(pp.82-3). 
beings together and, because we desire that others sympathize with us, 
serves as the foundation of ethics.9 Not only do we desire the sympathy of 
others, we desire to be worthy of their sympathy. "We desire both to be 
respectable and to be respected. We dread both to be contemptible and 
to be contemned."10 However, since the possession of riches often gains 
us more respect than the possession of virtue, the desire for approbation 
leads us to pursue wealth.11 Smith argues that we desire wealth not for its 
own sake, but because of vanity; in the Theory of Moral Sentiments he 
notes "the rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they 
naturally draw upon him the attention of the world . . . ." 1 2 Smith makes a 
similar point in the Wealth of Nations: "with the greater part of rich 
people, the chief enjoyment of riches consists in the parade of riches, 
which in their eyes is never so compleat as when they appear to possess 
those decisive marks of opulence which nobody can possess but 
themselves."13 
This feature of human nature creates an important problem for Smith: 
This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the 
rich and the powerful, and to despise, or, at least, to 
neglect, persons of poor and mean condition, though 
necessary both to establish and maintain the distinction 
of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the 
universal cause of the corruption of our moral 
sentiments."14 
Note that Smith is not troubled by hierarchy per se; he seems to regard 
the existence of social classes as part of a well-ordered society. 
Furthermore, without hierarchy and the corresponding desire to be 
admired for their relative wealth, people would lack one of the major 
incentives that Smith thinks will drive them to work hard to acquire riches. 
Even so, this desire must be kept within bounds because it causes us to 
despise the poor illegitimately, and can lead us to commit crimes in the 
pursuit of wealth. The problem is aggravated by our propensity to weigh 
our own happiness more heavily than the happiness of others.15 Our 
desire to be not only respected but respectable, combined with our 
knowledge that aggressive impulses must be contained, leads us to create 
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knowledge that aggressive impulses must be contained, leads us to create 
ethical rules. To check our ambition, vanity, and self-love, we learn to 
consider our actions from the point of view of an impartial spectator, which 
leads us to weigh everyone's happiness equally when acting and when 
formulating moral principles. We must do this, because if we fail to check 
our self-love, others will resent us and we will become "the object of their 
hatred and indignation."16 
The principle of sympathy and its consequence, the desire to be 
admirable and to be admired, when combined with the principle of self-
love provide the motive force for humans in Smith's economic theory. To 
gain the approbation of others, we produce far more goods than we can 
use. This creates a surplus that we trade with others, which fosters the 
division of labor and which, through a "trickle down" effect, is supposed to 
provide for the sustenance of the poor. 
HI. Implications of Smith's Philosophical Anthropology 
Smith's account of how and why economic transactions occur has a 
number of significant theoretical consequences for the poor. I have 
already noted that the existence of social classes is an important part of 
Smith's economic theory. In order to justify this aspect of his theory, Smith 
must do more than merely show that the presence of social classes 
increases productivity; he must also show that this productivity will benefit 
the poor, and that the economic system on the whole is fair. Smith 
attempts to do this by asserting that the effects of poverty are not nearly so 
dire as commonly supposed, and by drawing a sharp distinction between 
duties of justice and duties of beneficence. 
Smith, no doubt drawing on Stoic philosophy, denigrates the 
importance of material goods. He claims that we do not desire riches for 
their own sake, but because having them draws the attention and 
admiration of others. Power and riches in and of themselves are 
. . . enormous and operose machines contrived to 
produce a few trifling conveniencies to the body, 
consisting of springs the most nice and delicate, which 
must be kept in order with the most anxious attention, 
and which in spite of all our care are ready every 
moment to burst into pieces, and to crush in their ruins 
. their unfortunate possessor. They are immense fabrics, 
which it requires the labour of a life to raise, which 
threaten every moment to overwhelm the person that 
dwells in them, and which while they stand, though they 
may save him from some smaller inconveniencies, can 
,6TMSII.ii.2.1 (pg.83). 
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protect him from none of the severer inclemencies of the 
season. They keep off the summer shower, not the winter 
storm, but leave him always as much, and sometimes 
more exposed than before, to anxiety, to fear, and to 
sorrow; to diseases, to danger, and to death.17 
This description occurs in a long passage in which Smith describes the 
adverse effects suffered by "the poor man's son, whom heaven in its anger 
has visited with ambition" in his pursuit of wealth and power.18 This 
unfortunate 
submits in the first year, nay in the first month of his 
application, to more fatigue of body and more 
uneasiness of mind than he could have suffered through 
the whole of his life from the want of them [the 
conveniences afforded by wealth!.19 
Smith's conclusion, then, is that wealth is not an important component of a 
happy life, and that the pursuit of wealth can actually detract from one's 
felicity. 
The desire to acquire wealth is useful, however, because the rich 
consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their 
natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only 
their own conveniency, though the sole end which they 
propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they 
employ, be the gratification of their own vain and 
insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce 
of all their improvements. They are lead by an invisible 
hand to make nearly the same distribution of the 
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the 
earth been divided into equal portions among all its 
inhabitants.20 
17TMSIV.I.8 (pp. 182-83). 
18TMSIV.1.8(pg.l81). 
1 9 TMS 1V.I.8 (pg. 181). Smith's findings, though probably distressingly 
accurate descriptions of the fate of ambitious paupers, are suspect. The 
poor man's son who must struggle every minute to acquire wealth may 
indeed undergo the strain and ultimate misery Smith describes. However, 
the rich man's son, born into great wealth, may enjoy that wealth without 
having to go through the trouble of earning it, and can hire others to 
endure the drudgery of managing the family fortune. 
2 0 TMS 1V.1.10 (pp 184-85). 
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Smith's famous idea of the "invisible hand" allows him to argue that his 
economic theory will provide adequately for the poor and explain the 
mechanism by which this process occurs. 
Smith does not believe that the inequality of wealth between rich and 
poor is a serious problem, both because such inequalities are necessary to 
the dynamics of the economy and because the poor are not suffering 
unduly in any case. Assertions that living in poverty is not a great 
misfortune appear constantly in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. For 
example, Smith states that 
(ijn ease of body and peace of mind, all the different 
ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the beggar, who 
suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that 
security which kings are fighting for.21 
Even more outrageously, he asserts that if you "take the whole earth at an 
average, for one man who suffers pain or misery, you will find twenty in 
prosperity and joy, or at least in tolerable circumstances."22 Smith gives no 
source or empirical evidence for this dubious and optimistic 
pronouncement. In the Wealth of Nations, Smith presents a lengthy 
demonstration that the wages of the poor in Britain are well above the 
'lowest rate which is consistent with common humanity."23 His famous 
statement that "no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which 
the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable" should be 
read in light of his understanding of what constitutes poverty and misery.24 
Smith not only attempts to prove that most paupers live tolerable 
lives, but also that it is not the responsibility of the rich to care for those 
that do not. He asserts, contra "whining and melancholy moralists,"25 that 
it is undesirable even to try caring too much about the one man out of 
twenty whom poverty makes miserable. He maintains that 
whatever interest we take in the fortune of those with 
whom we have no acquaintance or connexion, and who 
are placed altogether out of the sphere of our activity, 
can produce only anxiety to ourselves, without any 
manner of advantage to them.26 
2 lTMSIV.I.ll(pg.l85). 
2 2 TMS HI.3.9 (pg. 140). It is interesting to compare this claim with John 
Stuart Mill's calculation that nineteen-twentieths of mankind involuntarily 
do without happiness. 
2 3 WN I.viii.28-WN I.viii.35 (pp. 91-96). 
2 4WNI.viii36(pg.96). 
2 5 TMS HI.3.9 (pg. 139). 
2 6TMS HI.3.9 (pg. 140). 
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can produce only anxiety to ourselves, without any 
manner of advantage to them.26 
Concern for paupers is unnecessary because, although human beings live 
in societies and are dependent on each other for survival to some extent, 
(elvery man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally 
recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take 
care of himself, than of any other person, it is fit and right 
that it should be so. 2 7 
A person's main moral duty is to friends, family, and him- or herself. Poor 
people, with the aid of God, should take care of themselves and each 
other.2 8 
Smith's conception of human beings as atomistic, autonomous 
individuals allows him to establish a sharp distinction between duties of 
justice and duties of beneficence. Justice is the "negative virtue," 
displayed by a man who "barely abstains from violating either the person, 
or the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours."29 A violation of justice 
"does real and positive hurt to some particular persons."30 By way of 
contrast, beneficence is the positive virtue of one who from love, gratitude, 
or friendship actively seeks to aid others. While failures of justice cause 
real harm, failures of beneficence merely "disappoint of the good which 
might reasonably have been expected," and as such are the proper object 
of "dislike and disapprobation," but not of punishment.31 Duties of justice 
are obligatory and lapses of duty may be punished by force; duties 01 
beneficence are meritorious but optional, and failure to perform them is 
hateful but not strictly wrong. This is because "(s)ociety may subsist, 
though not in the most comfortable state, without beneficence; but ttu 
prevalence of injustice must utterly destroy it." 3 2 
Smith's ethical theory is a perfect example of what Carol Gilligan 
terms an "ethic of rights." He sees people primarily as independent 
autonomous beings in competition with each other for material goods 
social standing, etc. An individual can subsist with only minima: 
cooperation from others, provided only that they act justly and do no, 
2 6TMSIIL3.9(pg.l40). 
2 7 TMS Il.ii.2.1 (pg. 82). Note here that Smith assumes that what is natura 
is what is good. Like his friend David Hume, he is generally very carefu 
not to reason from is to ought. 
28TMSVI.ii.3.6(pg.237). 
2 9TMSILi.l.9(pg.82). 
3 0TMSIUU5(pg.79). 
3 1TMSIl.i.l.3(pg.78). 
3 2 TMS II.ü.3.3 (pg. 86). 
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interfere with him or her. Helping others is admirable, but not strictly 
necessary: the rich do the poor no injustice as long as they refrain killing 
or robbing them. Thus, capitalism is justified not only because of its 
productivity, but on ethical grounds as well. 
fV. Critique 
As we have seen. Smith must show that the poor will not have to 
endure excessive suffering under his system. He therefore paints a 
romanticized picture of the poor as humble but happy people who often 
surpass their "betters" in virtue and who, spared the burden of riches, 
enjoy an enviable amount of leisure and peace of mind. However, there 
are a number of reasons to be skeptical of Smith's sanguine estimation of 
the condition of the poor (especially the poor of his time), and many 
passages in Smith's own writings seem to undermine this position. 
Compare the following two passages, the first concerning "savages" and 
the second concerning the poor in civilized countries: 
(Savages] are so miserably poor, that, from mere want, 
they are frequently reduced, or, at least, think 
themselves reduced, to the necessity sometimes of 
directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their 
infants, their old people, and those afflicted with 
lingering diseases, to perish with hunger, or to be 
devoured by wild beasts.33 
. . . in civilized society it is only among the inferior ranks 
of people that the scantiness of subsistence can set limits 
to the further multiplication of the human species; and it 
can do so in no other way than by destroying a great part 
of the children which their fruitful marriages produce.34 
Although in civilized countries the poor are not in much danger of being 
devoured by wild beasts and do not openly abandon infants. Smith 
recognizes that hunger still haunts them. It may well be that fewer people 
in civilized societies suffer from hunger than in "savage" ones, but the 
prevalence of hunger among the poor in civilized society does raise 
questions about whether they are really as well off as Smith often makes 
them out to be. 
Consider, too, the conditions under which the leisured and happy poor 
labor: 
3 3WN[I].4(pg.lO). 
34WNI.viii.40(pg.98). 
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The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few 
simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, 
always the same, or very nearly the same, has no 
occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his 
invention in finding out expedients for removing 
difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, 
therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally 
becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a 
human creature to become. The torpor of his mind 
renders him, not only incapable of relishing or bearing a 
part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any 
generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently 
of forming any just judgment concerning many even of 
the ordinary duties of private life.35 
Since, for Smith, sentiment is the foundation of morality, it would appear 
from this passage that most of those living in poverty are incapable of 
exercising any significant degree of moral virtue. It also seems 
unreasonable to expect that someone who is incapable of "forming any 
just judgement concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private 
life" will be able to live long or well. 
Some of the apparent contradictions can be reconciled if we 
distinguish between the rural poor and urban laborers. For instance, note 
that Smith's above account applies only to those engaged in simple, 
repetitive occupations, i.e. primarily urban workers employed in some type 
of factory or workshop. Smith explicitly separates these urban laborers 
from their country counterparts: 
Not only the art of the farmer, the general direction of 
the operations of husbandry, but many inferior branches 
of country labour require much more skill and 
experience than the greater part of mechanick trades.... 
His [the country laborer's] understanding. . . being 
accustomed to consider a greater variety of objects, is 
generally much superior to that of the other, whose whole 
attention from morning till night is commonly occupied 
in performing one or two very simple operations.36 
The nuanced understanding of the poor that Smith demonstrates in this 
passage is largely absent in many other parts of Smith's writings. He tends 
to write and think of the poor as an undifferentiated, monolithic group, and 
3 5 WN V.i.f.50 (pg. 782). 
3 6 WN I.x.c.24 (pp. 143-44). 
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often seems to be thinking exclusively of country laborers when writing of 
the poor, as in the following passage: 
In the middling and inferior stations of life, the road to 
virtue and that to fortune, to such fortune, at least, as 
men in such stations can reasonably expect to acquire, 
are, happily in most cases, very nearly the same. In all 
the middling and inferior professions, real and solid 
professional abilities, joined to prudent, just, firm, and 
temperate conduct, can very seldom fail of success.. . . 
Either habitual imprudence, however, or injustice, or 
weakness, or profligacy, will always cloud, and sometimes 
depress altogether, the most splendid professional 
abilities. . . . The success of such people, too, almost 
always depends upon the favour and good opinion of 
their neighbors and equals. . . . In such situations, 
therefore, we may generally expect a considerable 
degree of virtue; and, fortunately for the good morals of 
society, these are the situations of by far the greater part 
of humankind.37 
The success of small farmers and village artisans may depend on 
neighbors and equals, but the this does not hold as strongly, if at all, for 
factory workers. In largely anonymous urban environments, employers 
are unlikely to know or care much about the moral character of their 
unskilled workers. Furthermore, it would be odd to expect "a considerable 
degree of virtue" in people whose occupation renders them incapable of 
making "any just judgement" about morals or anything else of importance. 
Smith's overall estimation of the condition of most poor people also 
seems much more plausible if one is thinking of the rural poor rather than 
urban paupers. It seems possible that a country laborer living in a 
community with poor but virtuous neighbors and stimulated by a diverse 
range of tasks could lead a reasonably happy life despite his or her 
poverty. An urban worker, toiling away at a repetitive job that renders him 
or her as "ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become," 
seems much less likely to live happily. 
The idea that the poor can take care of themselves in bad times also 
makes sense only if one is thinking primarily of rural areas. Unlike their 
urban brethren, agricultural workers have access to food even when it is 
relatively scarce. Furthermore, rural paupers are much more likely to live 
in closely-knit communities with neighbors who, because of their station in 
life, will have developed a degree of virtue that renders them willing to 
help in bad economic times. Many urban workers will have few ties to 
37TMSI.iii35(pg.63). 
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most of their neighbors, and wilt therefore not be in much of a position to 
request or receive help from them. Remember that for Smith, duties of 
beneficence extend mostly to friends and family. Note also that the 
tendency of capitalism is to draw more and more people out of rural 
settings and into urban ones. Although work in the modern retail and 
service sectors is less mentally and physically stunting than the 
occupations available to the lower classes in Smith's time, the lack of 
stimulation available in such jobs is arguably still present in large part. 
None of this is meant to imply that Smith was some sort of monster 
who hated the poor. Smith goes into some detail describing how 
government action, in the form of the poor laws of England, can work to 
deny opportunities for betterment to the poor.38 He also opposed the idea 
that low wages for the poor are better for the morals of society than more 
generous wages.39 Surely, Smith genuinely believed that the poor would 
be better off under his system than others prevalent at the time. Still, his 
good intentions do not necessarily fully realize themselves in his system. 
Smith's discussion of the duties of beneficence is vulnerable to 
objections similar to those that can be raised about his account of the 
poor's condition, namely that in both cases, Smith draws generalizations 
after considering an insufficiently large group of people. Fundamental to 
Smith's claim that duties of beneficence are optional is the idea that 
"(e]very man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to 
his own care."40 Here Smith most likely has healthy, adult males in mind. 
Neither a small child, an old or infirm person, nor, in his time, a woman 
(not allowed to work in most occupations, paid next to nothing in most 
others, and expected to derive support from her husband) would fit this 
model very well. Although Smith docs note that "(t)he laws of all civilized 
nations oblige parents to maintain their children, and children to maintain 
their parents," the underlying assumption that most people need or 
deserve little assistance from others warrants re-examination.41 If duties 
of beneficence are stronger than Smith makes out, the ethical 
justifications for his economic theory (or at least a laissez-faire 
interpretation of it) are severely weakened.42 
3 8 WN I.x.c.45-59 (pp. 152-57). 
3 9 WN I.viii.36-57 (pp. 96-104). 
«TMSII.HJLl (pg.82). 
41TMSH.ii.l.8(pg.81). 
4 2 In WN V.i.f54 (pg. 785), Smith does advocate a kind of minimal public 
education which would provide instruction in how to "read, write, and 
account." What other types of government aid to the poor he would 
approve of is an interesting and difficult question. 
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Capitalist economic theory has, of course, developed a great deal 
since Smith wrote. Still, his fundamental ethical justifications are largely 
intact. Although in consumer economies material goods are probably 
regarded as more valuable in and of themselves than in Smith's theory, 
the underlying reasons for pursuing wealth have remained virtually 
unchanged. Many now pay lip service to the idea that the rich and the 
government have some obligation to the poor, but the atomistic view that 
society is made up of independent individuals solely responsible for their 
own well-being, which forms the basis for privileging duties of justice over 
duties of beneficence, is still widely held. The philosophical anthropology 
and the ethical claims necessary to provide justification for Smith's 
economic theory, therefore, are still with us today. Especially today, when 
many countries are converting to capitalist economies or contemplating 
such a converstion, an examination and critique of these claims and their 
consequences is vital. 
